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 ‘Success’ in policy piloting: process, programmes and politics.  32 
 33 
Abstract 34 
Research has demonstrated that pilots contain multiple shifting purposes, not all of which 35 
relate to simple policy testing or refinement. Judging the success of policy pilots is therefore 36 
complex, requiring more than a simple judgement against declared goals. Marsh and 37 
McConnell provide a framework against which policy success can be judged, distinguishing 38 
programme success from process and political success. We adapt Boven’s modification of 39 
this framework and apply it to policy pilots, arguing that pilot process, outcomes and longer 40 
term effects can all be judged in both programme and political terms. We test this new 41 
framework in a pilot programme in the English National Health Service, the Vanguard 42 
programme, showing how consideration of these different aspects of success sheds light on 43 
the programme and its aftermath. We consider the implications of the framework for the 44 




The piloting of policy initiatives prior to wider roll out (sometimes termed ‘policy 47 
experiments’) is increasingly popular in many jurisdictions (Heilmann, 2008; Nair & 48 
Howlett, 2016; Tassey, 2013), in part because of an implicit (and sometimes explicit) 49 
association with apparently rational and depoliticised policy making (Brodkin & Kaufman, 50 
2000; Martin & Sanderson, 1999). A UK Cabinet Office report in 2003 recommended 51 
piloting  as the default approach to policy making (Jowell, 2003), identifying a rational 52 
process by which pilots should be carefully evaluated prior to decisions about wider roll out. 53 
Rogers-Dillon (2004 p24) considers this vogue for policy piloting and identifies a yearning 54 
for a ‘cool, pristine world of policy’, technical, efficient and  removed from the ‘messy world 55 
of politics’. 56 
 57 
However, the reality is considerably more complex than this ideal implies. Exploring the 58 
operation of policy pilots in the English NHS, Ettelt et al (2014) suggest that, alongside 59 
rational testing of policy ideas, pilots are also used to expedite implementation, with the 60 
‘success’ of a pilot in meeting its goals less important than its ability to catalyse 61 
implementation. Moreover, Rogers-Dillon (2004) highlights the potential party political or 62 
ideological effects of pilots, arguing that the mere existence of ‘workfare’ pilots (ie 63 
programmes linking welfare entitlements to engagement with work) in some US states in the 64 
1990s shifted public and political opinion, rendering mainstream approaches to welfare which 65 
had previously been unthinkable. These effects were not linked to pilot outcomes, nor 66 
conduct, but rather the fact that their very existence overcame deeply embedded prior 67 
assumptions about fairness and equity in welfare programmes. Nair and Howlett (2016) 68 
situate pilots as ‘framing or projecting the future’ (p1), establishing meaning associated with 69 
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policies and expressing and enacting power relationships, whilst Bailey et al (2017) show 70 
local pilots providing a political narrative which enhanced an existing national policy agenda.  71 
 72 
How then, is the success of any given policy pilot to be judged? A straightforward 73 
experimentation approach implies the rational pre-specification of desired outcomes, 74 
followed by explicit judgement of their achievement, but the more messy and emergent 75 
process described by Ettelt et al (2014),  Bailey et al (2017) and Rogers-Dillon (2004) is not 76 
so easily judged. The question of general policy success has been addressed by a number of 77 
authors, led by Marsh and McConnell (Marsh & McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010) who 78 
identify three dimensions of policy success: process success, the successful making of policy, 79 
including passing legislation or creating a supportive coalition; programme success, 80 
encompassing  successful policy implementation and achievement of desired goals; and 81 
political success, the potential for policies to enhance a government’s reputation or advance 82 
its ideology. Bovens (2010) modifies this framework, arguing that both policy making and 83 
policy implementation can be considered in programme and political terms. In this paper we 84 
contend that such frameworks require further modification to address the nature of pilots as 85 
policy projects limited in time and occurring in specific places (Bailey, Hodgson, & 86 
Checkland, 2019), embodying complex and not necessarily straightforward purposes. We 87 
offer a modified framework to consider policy pilot success, and test it using an example of 88 
policy piloting in England.  89 
 90 
Our policy example is the Vanguard New Care Models programme in the English NHS 91 
(2014a). These well-funded and supported pilots were intended to derive and test  more 92 
integrated ways of providing health and care services (NHS England, 2015b). Officially 93 
designated as a ‘successful’ programme which has demonstrated better ways of designing 94 
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services (NHS England, 2019b), we draw upon an evaluation of the programme to consider 95 
this claim. Using our modified framework we show that, whilst the programme met some 96 
outcome goals, longer term local impact and further roll out have been limited. Moreover, we 97 
show how early political claims about success may have impeded the work required to 98 
facilitate either wider roll out or systematic learning from the pilots. This latter finding 99 
demonstrates the importance of including a political dimension in evaluating pilot success. 100 
We conclude by highlighting the value of our framework in supporting multi-faceted and 101 
comprehensive evaluations of policy pilots, which in turn may enable better understanding of 102 
later policy trajectories. . 103 
 104 
Policy success and failure 105 
McConnell (2010) argues for a more nuanced approach to policy success than one focusing 106 
upon the achievement of pre-defined goals. He suggests that the success or failure of any 107 
given policy will be plural and contested, and that the policy sciences: ‘lack an over-arching 108 
heuristic framework which would allow analysts to approach the multiple outcomes of 109 
policies in ways that move beyond the often crude, binary rhetoric of success and failure. 110 
(McConnell 2010, p346).  111 
 112 
He goes on to define such a framework, identifying three dimensions of policy success. 113 
Process success refers to the policy making process. McConnell (2010) suggests a successful 114 
policy process is one in which a ‘Government does what it sets out to do and opposition is 115 
virtually non-existent and support near universal’ (ibid p352). Dimensions of success include 116 
the establishment of a stable coalition behind a policy, and lack of significant opposition. 117 
Programme success encompasses successful implementation and the achievement of desired 118 
goals, including benefits for targeted populations. Finally, political success refers to the 119 
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political benefits accruing out of a particular policy. These might include sustaining an 120 
electoral coalition, enhancing electoral prospects or silencing opposition.  121 
 122 
Under each heading McConnell (2010) identifies a spectrum, from ‘success’ with criteria 123 
fully met, through to ‘failure’ when none of the criteria are met. In between – the ‘grey area’ - 124 
success may be partial, allowing more sophisticated judgements as to policy impacts (Marsh 125 
& McConnell, 2010).  126 
 127 
However, the complex formulation of dimensions of success across the three domains has 128 
been criticised. In a commentary accompanying the paper by Marsh and McConnell (2010),, 129 
Bovens (2010) argues that the authors make a category mistake in separating policy process, 130 
programmes and politics. He argues that policy process – ie the processes surrounding policy 131 
enactment– occupies a different analytical level to programme and political outcomes and can 132 
itself be evaluated both programmatically AND politically. Thus for Bovens, ‘policy process 133 
success’ can be both programmatic – e.g. when a piece of legislation is successfully 134 
manoeuvred through parliament - AND political -  when the passage of such legislation 135 
enhances a government’s political capital. Bovens (2010) goes on to argue for a 136 
categorisation of policy success or failure across two dimensions: process and outcomes; and 137 
programme and politics (see table 1).  138 
[table 1 near here] 139 
 140 
 141 
This approach thus distinguishes between political and programme success (which Bovens 142 
calls the ‘focus’ or perspective from which success is to be judged) and applies this to both 143 
policy formation and policy outcomes (the ‘locus’ or object of the assessment). This has the 144 
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advantage of separating the political benefits or disbenefits of policy making from those 145 
associated with policy implementation.  146 
 147 
More recently, focus has expanded to consider the temporal nature of judgements about 148 
policy success: at what point is it appropriate to judge a policy? In a recent book, t’Hart 149 
(2019) explores policy successes, adding the question of policy sustainability to McConnell 150 
and Marsh’s (2010) framework for judging success. He argues: 151 
A policy is a complete success to the extent that (a) it demonstrably creates widely 152 
valued social outcomes; through (b) design, decision-making, and delivery 153 
processes that enhance both its problem-solving capacity and its political 154 
legitimacy; and (c) sustains this performance for a considerable period of time, 155 
even in the face of changing circumstances. (t Hart, 2019 p5)  156 
 157 
Thus, he suggests that only policies which endure and deliver ongoing public value can be 158 
truly designated as ‘successful’. However, it remains unclear exactly what ‘a considerable 159 
period’ might be. Indeed, it could be argued that what constitutes a meaningful endurance of 160 
particular policies will depend upon such things as changes of government, with endurance 161 
beyond the hegemony of a particular political party potentially indicative of sustained success 162 
even if the absolute timescale remains short. Moreover, ‘endurance’ may, as demonstrated by 163 
Rogers-Dillon (2004), be less to do with programmatic endurance of a particular policy 164 
initiative and more to do with a long term shift in how society views a particular issue. The 165 
judgement of the extent of policy success becomes yet more complex when considering what 166 
Newman (2014) calls the ‘distributional’ question, arguing  that McConnell and Marsh fail to 167 
take account of the differential impact of policies on different sectors of society. McConnell 168 
et al (2020) take this further, providing a framework for considering not only differential 169 
societal impacts, but also the impact on actors at each level of the process: policy making; 170 
policy implementation and enactment; and politics. Thus, for example, a policy might benefit 171 
one political actor over another, enhancing their reputation and providing further 172 
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opportunities for influence, whilst at the same time providing material benefits to a particular 173 
sector of society.  174 
 175 
Thus a complex and multifaceted set of frameworks for judging policy success emerges, 176 
defining success from multiple perspectives, across time and through varied lenses, 177 
differentiating between material outcomes and those of a more political nature. Importantly, 178 
these approaches draw attention to the fact that desired outcomes might not be fully declared, 179 
and, as highlighted by such policy analysis approaches such as the advocacy-coalition 180 
framework (Sabatier, 2006; Sabatier & Weible, 2014) and Kingdon’s (1995) streams and 181 
windows, will usually entail agendas beyond the desire to provide public value.  182 
Success and policy pilots: an adapted framework 183 
How then, should we consider judging the success or otherwise of policy pilots? Pilots differ 184 
from full policy implementation in that they are limited in both time and space (Bailey et al., 185 
2019). Moreover, they embody the ostensibly rational purpose of testing potential policy 186 
solutions; they therefore rhetorically at least embody some uncertainty as to their value. 187 
Importantly, the temporal dimension of policy success expounded by t’Hart (t Hart, 2019) 188 
must be considered, with the longer term roll out or spread of piloted policies an important 189 
element to be judged.  190 
 191 
Much literature on policy piloting situates the use of pilots within the assumptions of 192 
evidence-based policy. as small-scale experiments testing a policy prior to wider roll out  193 
(Burch & Wood, 1983; Jowell, 2003). In practice these assumptions are challenged by the 194 
political constructions and uses of knowledge and evidence within pilots (Martin & 195 
Sanderson, 1999; Sanderson, 2002).  We expand upon these concerns to consider the 196 




Moving beyond the notion of experimentation, Harrison and Wood (1999), show how 199 
‘manipulated emergence’ arises out of incentivised early adoption of loosely defined ‘bright 200 
ideas’, which is argued to be more effective than conventional top-down implementation. 201 
This suggests a more ‘generative’ understanding of experimentation (Ansell & Bartenberger, 202 
2016), alongside other implicit purposes, such as exemplification. Ettelt et al (2014) extend 203 
this, suggesting that pilot programmes may be driven by a variety of purposes 204 
(experimentation, demonstration, early adoption, and learning), only some of which might be 205 
explicit, and which might shift and intersect during the programme. In this context, ‘success’ 206 
is not a simple concept, and requires an analytical approach which is attuned to the different 207 
political ‘levels’ which piloting traverses, as well as the temporal dimension of success 208 
implicit in moves from temporary pilots to enduring organisational arrangements (Bailey et 209 
al., 2019).  210 
Taking these issues into account, we draw upon Bovens’ (2010) modification of Marsh and 211 
McConnell’s (2010) framework. Agreeing with Bovens that both policy process and policy 212 
outcomes can and should be judged in both programme and political terms, we argue that, in 213 
keeping with Ettelt et al’s analysis, the longer-term roll out or termination of pilot 214 
programmes should also be considered across these two dimensions (see table 2).   215 
[Table 2 near here] 216 
Thus, we suggest that, in addition to considering the programme and political effects of the 217 
design and implementation of policy pilots, a longer-term view of the eventual impact of 218 
pilots should also be considered. We have termed this ‘pilot effects’. By this we mean the 219 
effect of the pilot beyond the immediate judgement as to whether ostensible goals have been 220 
met, and beyond the term of the pilot. In programme terms, taking the ostensibly rational 221 
view, pilots can should be judged according to whether or not apparently beneficial effects 222 
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are implemented more widely, or, if assessment demonstrates no obvious benefits, the pilots 223 
are rationally modified or terminated. More widely, pilot programme effects might also be to 224 
influence the shape or direction of future policy. The effect of the pilot from a political 225 
perspective, however, can be more complex to assess, as it may range from party political 226 
advantage through to less obvious accrual of power or advantage to one or more actors within 227 
the system. For example, in Rogers-Dillon’s (2004) example of workfare pilots in the US, 228 
political advantage accrued to the party in power, shifting public opinion to allow further 229 
changes to the welfare system without attracting electoral disadvantage. Alternatively, a pilot 230 
programme might empower a particular non-governmental body, enhancing their influence 231 
by association with an ostensibly successful pilot. Taking the view, with Lasswell (1936 232 
(2018)), that politics relates to the question of ‘who gets what, when, how?’, we argue that 233 
judgement of the political success or otherwise of pilots should consider how policies 234 
influence the distribution of power or resources in a political system alongside party political 235 
advantage. This political dimension is particularly important in considering pilot effects 236 
impacts, given their multiple, shifting and potentially undeclared purposes (Ettelt et al., 237 
2014).  However, we acknowledge that judging political success will be multifaceted and 238 
complex. In this paper we explore the effect of pilots on the distribution of power and 239 
resources; we do not explore in depth more diffuse questions of complex political goals or 240 
hidden agendas. We return to this question in our discussion.  241 
 242 
Finally, in considering McConnell et al’s (2020) distributional question, we acknowledge that 243 
any assessment of a policy pilot’s success will be from a particular perspective. A pilot which 244 
acts to empower one actor will often disempower another, and it is therefore important that 245 
the perspective from which success is being judged should be declared in operationalising the 246 





Population of the ‘cells’ in the framework requires evaluative work utilising multiple 250 
methods, from quantitative analysis of before-and-after outcomes to qualitative analysis 251 
examining political speeches and documents. In order to explore the utility of this framework 252 
in judging different aspects of ‘success’ as applied to policy pilots, we here apply it to an 253 
English national policy pilot scheme, the Vanguard New Care Models programme, 254 
combining findings from a variety of evaluative methods and approaches to produce an 255 
overall assessment of ‘success’.  256 
Research context: the NHS in England and the Five Year Forward View 257 
 258 
NHS England was created in 2012 as an Arm’s length Body, responsible for the delivery of 259 
health services to the population under a ‘mandate’ from the Department of Health and Social 260 
Care (Hammond et al., 2018).  In 2014 NHS England published a policy document, the Five 261 
Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014a), setting out the challenges facing the NHS, 262 
including demographic pressures and shrinking budgets following the global financial crash. 263 
The solution offered was increasing integration between different types of providers, 264 
‘dissolving traditional boundaries’ and ‘learning fast from the best examples’ (p16). The 265 
document proposed the creation of pilots – known as Vanguards – to test out new ways of 266 
providing services. A number of new service models were suggested, eventually consolidated 267 
into five different types of Vanguard (Table 3). Local areas were invited to apply, and, 268 
following a selection process, 50 sites were chosen and provided with additional funding as 269 
set out in Table 3. The substance of the service delivery models was left for the sites to 270 




An extensive support programme was established, alongside a formal evaluation programme. 273 
The findings presented here draw upon an independent national evaluation of the programme, 274 
commissioned and funded by the National Institute for Health Research Policy Research 275 
Programme (Checkland et al., 2019; Checkland et al., 2021). This evaluation focused upon 276 
the three Vanguard types which addressed integration between hospital, community and 277 
social care services (MCPs, PACS and ECHs).  278 
 279 
[table 3 near here] 280 
Crucially, the Five Year Forward View argued that ‘one size will not fit all’ (NHS England, 281 
2014a p9), with diversity of local solutions encouraged. The well-resourced support package, 282 
extensive programme of continuous evaluation and expectation of local determination makes 283 
explicit a rationale of ‘generative’ rather than ‘controlled’ experimentation (Ansell & 284 
Bartenberger, 2016). By this we mean that the design of the programme suggested a desire to: 285 
‘generat[e] and iteratively refin[e] a solution concept (an idea, innovation, design, policy, 286 
program, etc.) based on continuous feedback and with the goal of addressing a particular 287 
problem’ (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016 p68). Controlled experimentation, by contrast, 288 
would have initiated clearly delineated and characterised programmes, with before-and-after 289 
analysis of outcomes..  290 
 291 
The programme ran for three years from 2015. Vanguard pilots received £329 million, with 292 
£60 million spent on support and evaluation (National Audit Office, 2018) (Checkland et al., 293 
2019). The programme is referred to repeatedly in subsequent policy documents as having 294 
been ‘successful’ (NHS England, 2017, 2019a, 2019b). 295 
  296 
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In the rest of this paper we will explore the programme in depth, and consider this ‘success’ 297 
using the framework which we have derived from Bovens  (2010). A final section considers 298 
the value of this approach to exploring the success or otherwise of policy pilots.  299 
Methods 300 
The paper draws upon a wider evaluation programme, the findings of which are reported 301 
elsewhere (Checkland et al., 2019; Coleman, Billings, et al., 2020; Morciano et al., 2020). In 302 
this paper we look across the data collected to answer the questions:  303 
• To what extent can the Vanguard pilot programme be judged successful, across which 304 
dimensions? 305 
• Does our proposed framework capture relevant aspects of pilot success, and how 306 
might it be improved? 307 
We draw upon the findings from three elements of the research: initial qualitative study of 308 
programme initiation and oversight; qualitative case studies exploring programme operation; 309 
and an ongoing study of relevant policy documents, including those which use the Vanguard 310 
programme to make arguments about future policy direction. We contextualise our findings 311 
with reference to a quantitative impact analysis, published elsewhere (Morciano et al 2020). 312 
 313 
We first analysed all policy documents produced by NHSE to support the programme (NHS 314 
England, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2017), focusing upon understanding the espoused 315 
programme goals. Our analysis (Checkland et al., 2019) suggested that these were: 316 
• To implement integrated care programmes in designated Vanguard areas 317 
• To use Vanguard experiences to design ‘standard approaches and products’ which 318 
could be rolled out  319 
• To monitor performance against ‘benchmarks’ and use this information to guide 320 
future investment decisions 321 
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We then interviewed 29 stakeholders, including senior managers from NHS England, 322 
regional staff supporting local Vanguards, members of a national oversight group, and 323 
representatives of the national regulators, NHS Improvement and the Care Quality 324 
Commission. Interviewees were purposely selected to represent the principal groups of 325 
stakeholders involved in the programme, including senior managers responsible for its 326 
initiation, those leading the programme, those responsible for day to day running and those 327 
responsible for associated evaluative activity. In addition, we used ‘snowball’ sampling to 328 
identify key individuals with knowledge about particular aspects of the programme, including 329 
regulatory representatives and those with an advisory/oversight role. Table 4 details the 330 
interviewees.  331 
[table 4 near here] 332 
 333 
Interviews were semi-structured, with tailored topic guides for each group of interviewees. 334 
The focus was upon their experience of the planning, initiation and operation of the pilot 335 
programme, and its outcomes. The programme formally commenced in April 2015, and 336 
concluded at the end of March 2018. The interviews took place in years 2 and 3. Interviews 337 
were transcribed verbatim, and analysed using the computerised analysis programme NVivo.  338 
 339 
The second phase of the study took a qualitative case study approach to explore the processes 340 
and experiences of participants involved in implementing and operating the Vanguard 341 
programme (2015-2018) at the local level.  We selected six case-study sites to study in depth: 342 
two MCPs, two PACS and two ECH Vanguards.  Between October 2018 and July 2019, we 343 
carried out focus groups and interviews with a variety of respondents at six case study sites. 344 
Individual interviews were used to elicit individual participants considered reflections about 345 
their personal roles and experiences in the programme. Focus groups were used as a means of 346 
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eliciting reflective discussion amongst groups (O.Nyumba, Wilson, Derrick, & Mukherjee, 347 
2018). This approach was particularly used amongst groups of senior executives involved in 348 
the pilots and with public contributors, asking these contributors to retrospectively reflect 349 
upon historical events and decision-making processes. The focus group approach was 350 
particularly valuable in eliciting illuminating discussions which allowed us to understand 351 
from a variety of perspectives and in more depth how particular decisions came to be made.  352 
Interviews were a mix of face-to-face or telephone. Focus groups were conducted face-to-353 
face and facilitated by at least one researcher. A total of 80 respondents participated across 354 
the sites, including current and past representatives from Clinical Commissioning Groups 355 
(CCG), provider organisations, local authorities, voluntary sector organisations, Vanguard 356 
programme leads, frontline staff and patient/public contributors.  One NHS employee 357 
participated in both an interview and a focus group. 358 
[table 5 near here] 359 
Focus groups and interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim, followed by a thematic 360 
analysis using a coding schedule based on previous literature and our previous findings 361 
(Checkland et al 2019) using NVivo software.   362 
 363 
Our ongoing analysis of policy documents involves systematic capture and analysis of all 364 
major policy documents issued by NHS England or the Department of Health and Social Care 365 
from 2014. All new documents are read and interrogated for mention of the Vanguard 366 
programme. The content of relevant extracts is explored to consider: the context in which the 367 
Vanguard programme is mentioned; any claims made about its success; and the rhetorical 368 
uses made of any such claims. Our approach to this process is interpretive, viewing policy 369 
documents as pieces of rhetoric, seeking to make an argument (Winton, 2013). Our aim was 370 
therefore to understand which particular arguments the performance of the Vanguard 371 
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programme was used to underpin, in which contexts, in order to better understand how the 372 
programme is being used politically, by whom.   373 
 374 
For the purposes of this paper, all sources of data were synthesised and a second order 375 
analysis undertaken to consider pilot ‘success’ against our framework.  376 
 377 
Findings 378 
In this section we apply our framework for exploring policy success to the Vanguard 379 
programme. In keeping with our appreciation of the importance of McConnell et al’s (2020) 380 
distributional question (success for whom?), our perspective is that of those initiating the 381 
pilots, NHS England. We return to the question of other perspectives in our discussion.   382 
 383 
Pilot process programme success: was the programme successfully developed and 384 
initiated? 385 
From this viewpoint, the programme was a resounding success. The timescale involved was 386 
extremely tight: the Five Year Forward View (NHS England, 2014a) proposing the pilot 387 
programme was published in September 2014, with details about how to apply to join the 388 
programme announced in December and .the first 29 Vanguard sites chosen in March 2015. 389 
Pilot initiation followed within months. At the same time a wide-ranging support programme 390 
was set up (NHS England, 2015b), providing individual ‘account managers’ for each chosen 391 
site, alongside workstreams addressing anticipated issues in integrating care across 392 





By September 2015 (only 6 months after pilot initiation) all 50 sites were in operation across 396 
all five ‘models’, a designated National lead, Vanguard ‘model’ leads, support stream leads 397 
and strategic account managers appointed, funding distributed to sites and the support 398 
programme in operation. In programme terms, therefore, the pilot process was extremely 399 
successful.  400 
 401 
Pilot process political success: what was the political impact of the initiation of the 402 
programme? 403 
The political impact of the initiation of the Vanguard programme must be seen in the context 404 
of the contemporary political environment. When the Five Year Forward View was published 405 
in 2014, the NHS, along with other public services in the UK and elsewhere, was subject to 406 
so-called ‘austerity’ policies (The Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 2014) designed to 407 
support recovery from the global financial crash of 2008. NHS funding was consequently 408 
growing slowly and below the level of health care cost inflation (Appleby & Gainsbury, 409 
2017). The NHS was predicting a significant funding shortfall (Torjesen, 2012), and NHS 410 
England and the Department for Health and Social Care were negotiating with HM Treasury 411 
for additional funding. This was obtained in the form of ‘sustainability and transformation’ 412 
funding, a proportion of which was used to support the Vanguard programme (NHS England, 413 
2014b). This funding came with an expectation that there would be associated 414 
‘transformation’ in service delivery, rather than being used to pay down deficits. The 415 
Vanguard programme was thus established at least in part to ‘frame the future’ (Nair & 416 
Howlett, 2016 p1) by demonstrating that the NHS could change, and it could do so rapidly. 417 




In practice, what we found, a very strong interest, very often politically driven, to 420 
start demonstrating results very quickly.  And so, suddenly there’d be reports, the 421 
Secretary of State wants an update every Monday morning on rates of non-elective 422 
admissions in Vanguard areas, versus other areas.  Well, hang on a minute.  That’s 423 
not how the programme’s supposed to be up and running, and within a year you’re 424 
starting to ask those questions. (ID018) 425 
 426 
Whilst funding was initially offered to all Vanguard sites, by the third year of operation 427 
ongoing funding was tied to performance against centrally-determined targets, with 428 
Vanguards required to show that they had ‘earned their way’ (NHS England, 2017 p47). In 429 
November 2017, just over a year into the programme, a speech made by the Chief Executive 430 
of NHSE England (NHSE) (https://fabnhsstuff.net/fab-stuff/simon-stevens-ceo-nhs-england-431 
speech-nhs-providers-birmingham-november-8th-full) argued that the ‘Five Year Forward 432 
View ‘recipe’ is working’, before asserting that the main problem facing the NHS is not 433 
excess demand but ‘fragmentation and funding’. The speech finished with a suggestion that 434 
to support the further roll-out of the beneficial service changes demonstrated by the 435 
Vanguards, further additional funding would be required. Thus, the appeal to the Treasury for 436 
additional funding over and above that already provided was explicitly linked to the 437 
demonstration that the NHS had made rapid beneficial changes in service delivery. The rapid 438 
initiation and delivery of the Vanguard pilots was thus used politically to argue for additional 439 
funding for the NHS, and this argument was successful, with a new five year funding deal 440 
announced in July 2018 (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-on-the-nhs-441 
18-june-2018 ). Thus, in political terms as we have defined them, relating to the distribution 442 
of power or resources between actors in a political system, the pilot process was also 443 




Pilot outcome programme success: did the pilot programme achieve its stated goals? 446 
In terms of Ettelt et al’s (2014) characterisation of the purposes of pilot programmes, policy 447 
documents (NHS England, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2017) suggest that the Vanguard 448 
programme was conceived of as supporting both early implementation and learning, with an 449 
explicit intention that Vanguard sites would test out approaches to change, which could be 450 
spread more widely (Checkland et al., 2019). There was also an element of demonstration, 451 
with the argument made that:  ‘All three of these care models [PACS, MCPs and ECH] will 452 
demonstrate the reinvention of out of hospital care, with PACS and MCPs organising this for 453 
the whole population, and enhanced care homes targeting their approach to a care home 454 
setting.’(NHS England, 2015b p4). 455 
 456 
In July 2015 further guidance set out an explicit goal for the Vanguard programme to develop 457 
approaches which could be subsequently rolled out more widely: 458 
 459 
Each Vanguard system is rooted in its local diverse community. The national New 460 
Care Models programme draws together these individual local threads into explicit 461 
patterns, in order to exploit common opportunities for radical care redesign and 462 
remove barriers to change. Through the support package, our focus is on creating 463 
simple standard approaches and products, based on best practice and co-produced 464 
with Vanguards, which are designed from the outset for national spread. (NHS 465 




In addition, the programme was established with a well-resourced evaluation programme, 468 
suggesting that these pilots also embodied an experimental approach with genuine 469 
uncertainty as to whether the new approaches would work: 470 
 471 
The new models need to show how they help solve the particular issues 472 
confronting that particular health community, with proper safeguards against 473 
unintended consequences. ….. There’ll need to be independent evaluation, and 474 
regular performance benchmarking against comparable area, with periodic 475 
opportunities to decide whether to continue with or amend, the arrangements. 476 
(Stevens, 2014) 477 
 478 
There were thus a number of programme goals: 479 
• To implement integrated care programmes in designated Vanguard areas 480 
• To use Vanguard experiences to design ‘standard approaches and products’ which 481 
could be rolled out  482 
• To monitor performance against ‘benchmarks’ and use this information to guide 483 
future investment decisions 484 
 485 
The service changes introduced by Vanguards were eclectic, building upon previous 486 
initiatives and existing collaborative relationships. A great deal of activity happened in 487 
Vanguard sites, and new services or ways of working were introduced. In Pilot Outcome 488 
terms, there was thus demonstrable programme success in initiating and running new 489 




However, there was less success in developing the promised ‘standard approaches and 492 
products’ to be rolled out widely. The programme ran for three years, and towards the end of 493 
the programme ‘frameworks’ for each of the Vanguard types were published (NHS England, 494 
2016b, 2016c, 2016d). Two of these (MCPs and PACS) are at a high level of abstraction and 495 
diffuse, indicating areas of work which might be considered by those seeking to better-496 
integrate care across sectors. Neither offers standard approaches or ‘products’ which could 497 
straightforwardly support local action. The Enhanced Healthcare in Care Homes framework 498 
is somewhat more specific, setting out services which should be provided to improve care in 499 
Care Homes. (NHS England, 2014a) 500 
 501 
Finally it was intended that performance would be monitored and managed. At the start of the 502 
programme Vanguards were given significant leeway to determine their own outcome 503 
objectives, but halfway through the programme this changed, with funding for the final year 504 
contingent upon success against two metrics – reducing emergency hospital admissions and 505 
reducing the average length of stay in hospital.   506 
The impact of the programme on these standardised metrics has been explored in a 507 
quantitative evaluation (Morciano et al., 2020). The findings are nuanced, but essentially 508 
show that the programme was associated with a small fall in emergency admissions towards 509 
the end of the programme, and this was concentrated in the Care Home Vanguards. There 510 
was no effect on hospital length of stay.  511 
 512 
In summary, in programme terms the success of the pilot programme was mixed. Following 513 
rapid initiation, pilot sites worked quickly to make changes to the way services were 514 
delivered. However, the intention to use the programme to develop ‘standard approaches and 515 
products’ to support rapid replication of the Vanguard ‘new models of care’ was not realised, 516 
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apart from to a limited extent in the Care Home sites. Finally, by midway through the 517 
programme, funding was contingent on reducing emergency admissions, a standardised 518 
metric of success. There is evidence that this outcome was achieved in a limited way towards 519 
the end of the programme, mainly in the Care Home sites.  520 
 521 
Pilot outcome political success: did the outcomes of the programme have political 522 
impact? 523 
 524 
We will now consider the political impact of the programme outcomes, in terms of our 525 
definition of ‘political’ as relating to the distribution of power and resources within the UK 526 
state and from the perspective of those initiating the pilots. In 2019 NHS England published 527 
its NHS Long term Plan (NHS England, 2019b). This 10 year plan set out NHS priorities 528 
over the longer term and was, in part, a response to the announcement that spending on the 529 
NHS would increase at more than the rate of inflation for the next five years. The Plan sets 530 
out how the NHS will spend this ‘taxpayers’ investment’ responsibly (NHS England, 2019b 531 
p100). Whilst not explicitly asking for further additional funding, the Plan could be argued to 532 
be part of the ongoing case being made by one public service that it was deserving of an 533 
additional share of public resources. 534 
 535 
In making this case, the ‘success’ of the Vanguard programme forms a prominent element of 536 
the argument: 537 
 538 
Following three years of testing alternative models in the Five Year Forward View 539 
through integrated care ‘Vanguards’ and Integrated Care Systems, we now know 540 
enough to commit to a series of community service redesigns everywhere. The 541 
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Vanguards received less than one tenth of one percent of NHS funding, but made a 542 
positive impact on emergency admissions, and demonstrated the benefits of 543 
proactively identifying, assessing and supporting patients at higher risk to help 544 
them stay independent for longer. (NHS England, 2019b p13) 545 
 546 
This was accompanied by a bar chart (figure 1). 547 
[figure 1 near here] 548 
The source of this chart is an internal evaluation of the Vanguard programme which has not 549 
been published; it is therefore not available to be examined.  Notwithstanding this, the 550 
existence of a single outcome metric showing a positive effect is used in national policy 551 
documents as evidence of pilot programme success. The outcomes of the pilot programme (as 552 
presented in this chart) are thus being used politically because they are underpinning the 553 
claim that the NHS is deserving of additional resources.  554 
 555 
Pilot effects programme success: what happened next? 556 
Although the Long Term Plan references ‘a series of community service redesigns 557 
everywhere’, in practice, only the Enhanced Healthcare in Care Homes Vanguard has been 558 
implemented more widely. Linked to a new primary care contract, groups of GPs are being 559 
incentivised to set up new services for Care Home residents which have some similarities to 560 
the Vanguard ECHC service framework (Coleman, Croke, & Checkland, 2020). In other 561 
areas elements of the Vanguard MCP and PACS service changes have been retained or 562 
locally spread, but there has been no systematic wider implementation as envisaged by the 563 
initial pilot policy, with no ‘simple standard approaches’ which can straightforwardly spread 564 
(Checkland et al., 2021). Thus, there was no clear programme success in the form of 565 




One reason for the failure of the pilot programme to catalyse the widespread changes 568 
originally envisaged is that national policy changed only a year into what was intended to be 569 
a five year programme.  This new policy mandated the formation of 44 geographical areas of 570 
the country into groups of care providers who were obliged to produce plans (Sustainability 571 
and Transformation Plans - STPs) to promote service integration (Hammond et al., 2017).  At 572 
this point, the pilot projects had yet to be fully implemented, and there were no obvious 573 
beneficial outcomes. Yet the STP national policy stated that funding would only be granted to 574 
each area if they could address the following questions:  575 
 576 
What are your plans to adopt new models of out-of-hospital care, e.g. Multi-577 
specialty Community Providers (MCPs) or Primary and Acute Care Systems 578 
(PACS)? Why should NHS England prioritise your area for transformation 579 
funding? And when are you planning to adopt forthcoming best practice from the 580 
enhanced health in care homes Vanguards? (NHS England, 2015a p15) 581 
 582 
Thus, before any beneficial outcomes were possible, initiating wider roll out was a condition 583 
of obtaining additional funding for a different programme. However, as we have seen, such 584 
roll out has not occurred, apart from in the limited case of Care Homes. Participants in the 585 
Vanguards told us that they felt that in the second half of the programme policy attention had 586 
shifted elsewhere. 587 
 588 




…we expected there to be some kind of conference where all the Vanguard teams 591 
would come together, and everybody would say what they'd done, you know, 592 
specific to their own team, and you know, what their own statistics were.  There was 593 
nothing, nothing like that at all.  (S4R011) 594 
 595 
The programme effect success of the pilots has also been attenuated by the failure to realise 596 
the initial aim of learning from the pilots’ experience. Whilst there was a broad and well-597 
financed internal evaluation programme (NHS England, 2016a), and each Vanguard procured 598 
a local evaluation (Wilson et al., 2019), no overall report has been published, and there is no 599 
public statement of ‘lessons learned’ available. It could thus be said that, despite a rhetorical 600 
commitment to drawing together wider lessons to facilitate pilot impact, there were only 601 
limited attempts to do this. 602 
 603 
In summary, there has only been limited success in terms of longer term pilot programme 604 
effects, with only a small degree of roll out to non-pilot areas (in respect of Care Homes) 605 
despite announcements and policy requirements that this should happen. 606 
 607 
Pilot effect political success: what has been the political effect of the pilot? 608 
It is perhaps too early to clearly identify the extent to which the overall effect of the pilots 609 
supports political claims to success. As evidenced by the Long Term Plan and narratives 610 
around Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships there is a political narrative that the 611 
Vanguard programme has ‘worked’ and has shown how services should be redesigned to 612 
improve integration as well as demonstrating the efficient use of ‘taxpayers’ investments’, 613 
but there is limited evidence that this has led to any specific subsequent activity, with the 614 
exception of new services for Care Homes. Policy focus is now upon the transformation of 615 
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Sustainability and Transformation partnerships into what are known as ‘Integrated Care 616 
Systems’. In policy documents setting how these are being developed, the Vanguard 617 
programme is again referenced as providing a blueprint: 618 
 619 
[Integrated Care Systems] also incorporate learning from initiatives such as the 50 620 
‘vanguards’ that tested and refined new care models. In the most successful of these 621 
vanguards, NHS providers and commissioners, councils, care homes and others 622 
developed more preventive approaches to care and saw significant reductions in 623 
emergency admissions. (NHS England, 2019a p2) 624 
 625 
Thus it is claimed that Vanguard learning has been incorporated into new policy, in spite of 626 
limited publicly-available evidence that this is actually the case. Whilst this new development 627 
is not overtly political in the sense of bolstering arguments for an additional share of 628 
resources, the Integrated Care Systems policy has a political element in that their 629 
establishment will require legislative change (NHS England, 2020). Thus claims to lasting 630 
effects arising from the Vanguard pilots are being used to support calls for particular changes 631 
to legislation. Moreover, Vanguards received considerable additional funding (National Audit 632 
Office, 2018), whereas follow on initiatives have not. This embeds a political (distributional) 633 
inequity in the developing system.   634 
There is thus some evidence of ongoing political dividends and effects associated with the 635 







We began this paper by suggesting that the conceptualisation of policy pilots as rational, 641 
experimental processes proceeding in discrete stages is not reflected in the reality which can 642 
be messy, performative and political. Recognising this, drawing conclusions about the 643 
success or failure of pilots becomes more complex and uncertain than the assessment of pre-644 
specified outcomes from standardised interventions. Building upon others’ work in this field, 645 
we have developed a framework to support deconstruction of the impact of policy pilots 646 
across a number of dimensions and exploration of success within each. Applying this 647 
framework to the Vanguard programme case study, we have found that it supports a more 648 
nuanced, detailed account of different aspects of pilot ‘success’. This facilitates moving 649 
beyond a simple assessment of whether or not initial outcomes were met to interrogate the 650 
ways in which the pilot programme has been used politically to achieve other things. This fits 651 
with Ettelt et al’s (2014) account of the complexity, ambiguity and mobility of the purposes 652 
of policy piloting, providing a framework which surfaces pilot impacts which might 653 
otherwise be hidden, and potentially allowing more nuanced causal explanations to be 654 
considered. 655 
 656 
Table 6 summarises our assessment of the ‘success’ of the Vanguard pilot programme against 657 
3 categories within 2 dimensions: programme and politics.   658 
[table 6 near here] 659 
In our case, whilst claims have been made that current policy is building upon lessons learned 660 
from the Vanguard programme, there is little public evidence of any systematic attempt to 661 
draw lessons from the pilot programme. One possible explanation for this may lie in the 662 
strongly positive political claims to success which have been made nationally. Once the Long 663 
Term Plan had declared the programme a ‘success’, a more nuanced study of what had gone 664 
badly as well as what had gone well becomes unnecessary and perhaps more difficult, with 665 
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the danger that public consideration of problems or difficulties might disturb the narrative of 666 
success constructed to bolster the case for additional NHS funding. 667 
 668 
This assessment is from the perspective of the body initiating and running the pilots, NHS 669 
England. Space precludes a full assessment from other perspectives as recommended by 670 
McConnell et al (2020), but it is possible to see that this exercise could be rerun from 671 
alternative viewpoints. For example, exploration from the perspective of local participants in 672 
the Vanguard programme might lead to consideration of the local and national political 673 
advantages for both individuals and organisations arising out of association with a high-674 
profile pilot programme. In this vein, Bailey et al (2017) suggest that local actors’ reputations 675 
were enhanced by association with local pilots which were seen to have influenced national 676 
policy, whilst Hammond et al (2021) found that, regardless of the lack of any meaningful 677 
local programme success in high-profile innovation policy pilots, local actors felt that their 678 
engagement with the pilot programme positioned them well for further funding opportunities. 679 
Alternatively, examination from the perspective of the Department of Health and Social Care 680 
might suggest a political dividend arising out of the appearance of supporting a rational 681 
approach to healthcare reform, something seen as valuable in the aftermath of what was 682 
generally agreed to be a disastrous major reorganisation of the NHS in 2012 (Timmins, 683 
2012). The explicit declaration of the perspective from which the framework is being applied 684 
facilitates this type of engagement with the multi-scalar and temporally and geographically 685 
bounded nature of policy pilots.  686 
 687 
The model we have proposed extends the work of McConnell and Marsh (Marsh & 688 
McConnell, 2010; McConnell, 2010) and Bovens (2010). In particular we have shown how 689 
assessments of pilot success can usefully separate out an assessment of the outcomes of 690 
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particular pilots from the assessment of the longer term effect of the pilots in influencing 691 
policy more generally, either via wider roll out or via judicious adjustment of policy design, 692 
engaging with the temporal aspect of policies as advocated by t’Hart et al (2019). Moreover, 693 
we have shown that such longer term effects have both programme and political dimensions. 694 
However, the political dynamics associated with the Vanguard programme are particular in 695 
the sense that NHSE, an arm’s-length body, is driving policy change whilst simultaneously 696 
making the case for the health service to receive additional funding (Hammond et al., 2018; 697 
Rutter, 2014). While the process, outcome, and effect elements, both in relation to 698 
programmatic success and political success, are features that can clearly be ascribed to any 699 
policy pilot, future research could usefully explore the application of the framework to pilots 700 
in other sectors and contexts to explore avenues for its refinement and to consider its wider 701 
applicability. We would argue that our broad definition of ‘political success’ and our explicit 702 
use of multi-faceted evaluation approaches supports potential cross-sector transferability, but 703 
this contention should be tested. 704 
 705 
Perhaps the most complex area of the framework is in judging political success. We have 706 
judged political success to be evidenced by the making of claims in other contexts which 707 
suggest that this particular policy pilot programme was successful or important in order to 708 
bolster arguments or support other policies which aim to improve the funding status of the 709 
NHS or influence the legislative agenda.  However, we have not engaged with a broader 710 
consideration of political effects in terms of the advancement of the interests of other relevant 711 
parties, nor of the possibility that pilots may address altogether more complex political goals 712 
or hidden agendas (McConnell, 2018). For example, it is possible that, on occasion, simply 713 
doing something, regardless of outcome, may act to reduce political pressure – co-called 714 
‘placebo’ policies (McConnell, 2020). We do not see evidence that the Vanguard pilots fall 715 
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into this category, but this illustrates the fact that judgements of political success must take a 716 
broad and expansive view beyond ostensible or clearly visible effects.   717 
 718 
Time is central to the character of pilots, which imply some transitory constellation of actors 719 
and elements intended to foster the development of some more permanent form (Bailey et al., 720 
2019). Our proposed framework facilitates the separating out of pilot outcomes from wider 721 
effects, including learning or rollout, and allowing the analyst to consider local success 722 
against stated goals separately from longer term effects. However, when objectives are 723 
malleable and change during the pilot period as with the Vanguard programme, then a 724 
process for drawing conclusions about success needs to make explicit the answer to ‘success 725 
as defined when?’ and clearly chart the revision of objectives and claims of success, and the 726 
political or process consequences associated with any of these (t Hart, 2019). In the case of 727 
the Vanguards, we have suggested that the early declaration of success may have had 728 
important consequences for wider policy. Moreover, in keeping with Ettelt et al (2014), 729 
shifting objectives also had process implications for the pilots, as an initial permissive 730 
approach shifted to a focus on a single metric of success halfway through the programme.  731 
 732 
 733 
Conclusion    734 
Policy pilot evaluations often adopt a relatively simplistic approach of considering whether or 735 
not a pilot has ‘worked’ against particular outcome criteria. We have shown that this 736 
represents a limited understanding of the purposes and effects of pilots. We have brought 737 
together literature on policy success with that on policy pilots to generate a framework within 738 
which empirical evaluation findings can be synthesised with analysis of the wider policy 739 
landscape to consider pilot success in a more nuanced and multi-faceted way. Whilst no such 740 
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framework can be completely comprehensive, and judgements as to ‘success’ in each 741 
category will be contingent, provisional and potentially arguable, we would suggest that the 742 
most valuable aspect of the framework is its focus on explicit delineation of different 743 
dimensions of success and on the declaration of the perspective being adopted. Whilst 744 
different commentators may disagree with particular judgements in each cell of our summary 745 
table, the criteria by which we are judging and the specific aspect of the pilot being judged 746 
are clear, providing a more nuanced evaluation framework and facilitating constructive 747 
discussion. Furthermore, we believe that explicitly considering pilots across all of these 748 
dimensions holds promise in supporting the design of more comprehensive and nuanced 749 
evaluation programmes which move beyond a simplistic attempt to demonstrate ‘what 750 
works’. We have also shown how the explicit separation between programme and political 751 
elements of success allows interrogation of the antecedents of particular policy decisions, 752 
facilitating deeper understanding of contemporary policy trajectories. This in turn supports a 753 
more nuanced understanding of later policy developments. For example, we suggest that 754 
early political claims to the success of the Vanguard programme may have inhibited longer 755 
term consideration of the practical steps required to facilitate programme success, with 756 
potentially significant implications for NHS managers seeking to implement new approaches 757 
to service integration.. Moreover, we would suggest that our framework facilitates a more 758 
nuanced understanding of pilots, looking beyond stated rationales, and encouraging 759 
evaluators and others to explicitly consider the extent to which particular pilots do indeed 760 
represent a rational attempt to test policy ideas, or whether they in fact represent an approach 761 
to implementation. ‘Success’ can then be judged against these more complex objectives. We 762 
invite others interested in this area of research to consider the applicability of this approach in 763 
other fields, with a particular focus upon issues of temporality and methods to identify 764 
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Table 1: Dimensions of policy success (adapted from Bovens (2010)  899 
 900 
 Programme success Political success 
Policy process  Policy developed as planned, 
legislation successfully passed,  
Passing the legislation or developing 
the policy enhanced the government’s 
reputation or electoral prospects 
Policy 
outcome 
Policy implemented as 
planned, policy outcomes 
achieved 
The implementation or outcome of the 
policy enhanced the government’s 
reputation 
 901 
Table 2: Dimensions of policy pilot success 902 
 903 
 Programme success Political success 
Pilot 
process 
Did the piloting programme happen 
– ie was it developed and 
implemented? 
Did pilot initiation have any positive 
political consequences, for whom? 
Pilot 
outcomes 
Did the piloting programme meet its 
ostensible goals? 
Did its eventual outcome have any 




Was the programme locally 
sustained and /or more generally 
rolled out? OR was it rationally 
modified or discontinued? Was 
future policy altered as a result? 
Did roll out or discontinuation have 
positive political consequences, for 
whom? 
 904 
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9 Joining up GP, hospital, 
community and mental 
health services to improve 
the physical, mental, social 
health and wellbeing of the 
local population. Population-
based care model based on 









14 Moving specialist care out of 
hospitals into the community. 
Working to develop 
population based health and 
social care. Population-based 









6 Offering older people better, 
joined up health, care and 
rehabilitation services. Care 
homes working closely with 
the NHS, Local authorities, 
the voluntary sector, carers 
and families to optimize 








8 New approaches to improve 
the coordination of services 








13 Linking local hospitals 
together to improve their 
clinical and financial 
viability, reducing variation 
in care and efficiency 
13  
(One year only) 
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Table 4: interviewees in phase 1 911 
 912 
Interviewee type Numbers interviewed 




Table 5: Interviewees and focus groups phase 2 914 
 915 




NHS employees (current / past) 48 14 
Local Authority 
Private/Community/Charity sector  
4 
9                          
- 
1 
Public contributor 1 4 
 916 
Table 6: summary assessment of the ‘success’ of Vanguards as pilots 917 
 918 
 Programme success Political success 
Pilot 
process 
Full success – rapidly and 
successfully initiated 
Rapid initiation of change programme 
used politically to bolster arguments 
for additional funding 
Pilot 
outcomes 
Pilots successfully implemented and 
locally popular.  
Some outcome goals met.  
Standardised ‘models of care’ only 
developed in the care of Care Home 
Vanguards 
Outcome success against a single 
metric used politically to support a 
longer term policy programme 
Pilot 
effects 
Roll out limited to Care Home 
Vanguard, although elements from 
other models used locally to inform 
integrated care developments 
Limited evidence of systematic 
learning from the pilots 
Claims made that new initiatives are 
based upon ‘learning from the 
Vanguards’; pilots used to make 











Figure 1: the impact of the Vanguard programme as set out in the NHS Long Term Plan (NHS England 926 
2019b, p13) 927 
 928 
